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Author:
Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason
University of Michigan School of Information
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| Description: |
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Course prepares you to advise clients or your own organization on the design of contracts and screening policies when one of the parties has an information advantage over the other. For example, students study the design of patent licenses (the licensor knows more about the market), the design of social systems to reduce spam (the spam sender knows more about the content before the recipient decides whether to read), and the design of performance contracts for professional services (e.g., consultants, contract programmers, etc., when the contractor knows more than the employer about her level of effort). This course follows SI 646.
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| Keywords: |
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screening policies, contracting incentive centered design, contract design, signaling, intellectual property, incentive centered design methodology
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| More information about this material: |
Primary Audience:
College General Ed,
College Lower Division,
College Upper Division,
Graduate School,
Professional
Mobile Compatibility:
Not specified at this time
Language:
English
Material Version: 0
Cost Involved:
unsure
Source Code Available:
no
Accessiblity Information Available:
no
Copyright:
yes
Creative Commons:
This work is licensed under a
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 United States
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About this material: |
Peer Reviews (not reviewed)
Workflow status (Not triaged)
Comments (none)
Learning Exercises (none)
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