Material Detail

The use of scanning systems (e.g., radiation portal monitors and X-ray imagers) at border checkpoints is said to act as a deterrent to the smuggling of radiological/nuclear materials, drugs, and other illicit items. Can such deterrent effects be measured? The author examines “extended” screening models that incorporate the motivations, perceptions, and decision-making behaviors of different smuggling populations. Model predictions are compared to individual cases of radiological/nuclear smuggling and aggregated data on drug smuggling. These comparisons point to tentative conclusions regarding conditions under which scanning systems might act as a deterrent. Such conclusions are limited by a reliance on open-source information, the small number of cross-border radiological/nuclear smuggling cases on record, the high level of aggregation in the drug smuggling data used, the need to make very rough estimates of some intermediate variables, and the fact that cognitive and behavioral models have not been validated for the specific populations being studied here.

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