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Equilibrium Transitions in Stochastic Evolutionary Games

Equilibrium Transitions in Stochastic Evolutionary Games

This video was recorded at 4th European Conference on Complex Systems. We analyze the long-run behaviour of stochastic dynamics in well-mixed populations and in spatial games with local interactions. We review results concerning the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria. To address the problem of equilibrium selection in spatial games with many players, we introduce a concept of ensemble stability. The standard stochastic stability describes a long-run behaviour of systems with a fixed number of players in the zero-noise limit. On the contrary, the ensemble stability is concerned with a fixed (but nevertheless low) noise level in the limit of the infinite number of players. We present examples of games in which when the number of... Show More

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