Material Detail

In 2006, “private placement” was officially recognized by China Securities Regulatory Commission. Private placement is favored by listed companies because of its low cost and simple operation, and has become the preferred way of equity refinancing. However, this way also provides a channel for the large shareholders to infringe on the interests of the small shareholders. Through theoretical analysis, this paper finds that due to the problems of asymmetric information and principal-agent, the large shareholders have great motivation to carry out interest transfer, and analyzes the means and ways of interest transmission. Based on this theoretical analysis, case analysis is carried out. Taking PowerChina as the research object, this paper analyzes the related party transactions, cash dividends and the value evaluation of the injected assets to explore whether there is the problem of interest transmission in the overall listing of private placement. If so, what are the means for the enterprise to carry out the benefit transfer, so as to provide supervision and Administration for the regulatory authorities Provide basis for improvement. According to the above behavior, we can draw the following enlightenment: relevant departments should strengthen supervision and enterprises should strengthen the evaluation of the quality of injected assets; small and medium-sized investors should invest rationally.