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Internet Advertising and Optimal Auction Design

Internet Advertising and Optimal Auction Design

This video was recorded at 14th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD), Las Vegas 2008. We characterize the optimal (revenue maximizing) auction for sponsored search advertising. We show that a search engine's optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders. Using simulations, we consider the changes that result from a search engine's choice of reserve price and from changes in the number of participating advertisers.
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